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ARTICLES 
KNOWING KILLING AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW , 
LISA HEINZERLING* 
My goal here is modest: I simply wish to defend the view that 
the moral commitment against knowing killing should playa role 
in decisions about environmental problems. In recent years, 
economic analysis has substantially succeeded in de-ethicizing 
environmental issues; this paper is part of an effort to re-ethicize 
them. 
In previous work, I have criticized the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in making decisions about the environment. I One source 
of my criticism has been the mismatch between moral values and 
economic valuation. I have, however, tended to leave the moral 
values I have defended rather vaguely defined. In this paper, I 
wish to identify one very specific, deeply embedded moral value 
and to explain its incompatibility with cost-benefit analysis. 
The moral norm on which I will focus is the prohibition 
against murder-against the knowing killing of one person by 
another. This moral commitment is reflected in laws in all fifty 
U.S. states, in modem regulatory laws at the federal level, and in 
civil jury awards in tort cases involving profit-oriented 
corporations. This commitment is also reflected in otherwise 
disparate approaches to moral philosophy and in the moral 
traditions of all of the world's major religions. The moral value I 
am targeting is thus not a new norm, nor, in its traditional setting, a 
controversial one. But, as we will see, applying this norm outside 
its familiar contexts-including everyday shootings, stabbings, and 
the like-creates several complications . 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to 
David Tarr for excellent research assistance and to Robin West for very helpful 
comments. A version of this paper was delivered at the 2005 University of North 
Carolina Environmental Symposium, "Perspectives on Environmental Values." 
I See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLlNG, PRICELESS: ON 
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). 
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This nonn surfaces in the environmental context because 
there are now clearly established links between many common 
environmental contaminants and human mortality. Fine 
particulates in the ambient air kill tens of thousands of people 
every year in the United States alone.2 Widely used chemicals 
such as vinyl chloride pose risks of lethal cancer and other 
diseases.3 Greenhouse gases contributing to climate change will 
cause increased incidence of human disease, in addition to many 
other health-related effects.4 And so on. The basic idea is that 
pollution kills people and makes them sick, and, in many cases, we 
can expect death as a consequence of pollution. 
Although I do not think there is much question as to the 
existence of a deeply embedded moral commitment against 
knowing killing, I would like to put a bit of flesh on the bones of 
. that commitment by identifying several ways in which this moral 
nonn is embedded in the U.S. legal system. This nonn surfaces in 
three quite different legal contexts: traditional criminal law, 
modem environmental statutes, and tort law. In all three contexts, 
law corroborates the moral commitment I have identified. I do not 
claim that the technical elements of each legal standard are met in 
every case of environmental hazard, or that prosecutors should 
begin to bring scores of murder cases against polluters. My goal is 
merely to suggest that the moral commitment against knowing 
killing should playa role in environmental decisions. To that end, 
the second half of this essay considers the moral implications of 
cost-benefit analysis and how this approach may lead to a violation 
of the moral nonn against knowing killing. 
The most obvious area in which the nonn against knowing 
killing is incorporated in the legal system is traditional criminal 
2 See DEBORAH S. SHPRENTZ, NATURAL REs. DEF. COUNCIL, BREATH-
TAKING: PREMATURE MORTALITY DUE TO PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTION IN 239 
AMERICAN CITIES (1996); see also Douglas W. Dockery et aI., An Association 
Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six u.s. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 
1753, 1755 (1993) (finding an approximately twenty-six percent increase in 
premature death attributable to fine-particulate air pollution). 
3 See, e.g., Richard Lewis et aI., Vinyl Chloride and Liver and Brain Cancer 
at a Polymer Production Plant in Louisville, Kentucky, 45 J. OCCUPATIONAL & 
ENVTL. MED. 533 (2003). 
4 See NAT'L ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE 
REs. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: 
THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE V ARIABILITY AND CHANGE, 102-07 
(2000), available at http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrplLibrary/nationalassessmenti 
overview.htm. 
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law. Every state prohibits knowing killing. There are many 
different formulations of this basic prohibition. For sake of 
simplicity, here is the formulation offered by the highly influential 
Model Penal Code: murder is a homicide committed with the 
knowledge that death is "practically certain" to occur.5 Some 
states add the requirement of premeditation or "malice 
aforethought" (a famously problematic subject in criminal law): 
there must be some thought given to the killing before the killing 
occurs.6 In a related vein, some states require a person to engage 
in a "careful weighing" of the factors behind the decision to kill in 
order for the killing to count as murder.7 Somewhat less serious 
penalties are attached to killings that result from moments of 
heated passion, in which the victim provokes the killer into an 
excusable rage or other agitated mental state. Here, the crime is 
typically viewed as manslaughter rather than murder. Specific 
legal formulations vary from state to state, but the underlying 
normative idea is clear enough: sober reflection on the decision 
whether to kill another human being makes the killing more 
problematic, from a moral perspective, than impulsive action in the 
heat of a difficult moment. Across a range of cases, therefore, 
murder might be said to be a crime of dispassion rather than of 
paSSIOn. 
Thus, under our criminal laws, a person is a murderer if she 
engages in a course of conduct that she knows carries with it a 
practical certainty of death. To say that a person is a murderer is 
to deliver one of the most serious moral judgments our society 
makes. For murderers, we not only reserve some of the most 
severe penalties, including long jail time and possibly even death 
by execution, but also the most severe stigmatization and moral 
opprobrium. The punishment and the stigma identify the murderer 
as a person who has ranged far beyond society's bounds of 
5 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(b )(ii), 210.2 (2002). 
6 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2001) (premeditation); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § l87(a) (West 1999) (malice aforethought); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
2101 (LexisNexis 2001) (premeditated malice); FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1993) 
(premeditation). 
7 See, e.g., Kleve v. Hill, 202 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(characterizing premeditation as "careful weighing and pondering"); State v. 
Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 541 (Tenn. 1992) ('''[D]eliberation' is the process of 
carefully weighing such matters as the wisdom of going ahead with the proposed 
killing, the manner in which the killing will be accomplished, and the 
consequences which may be visited upon the killer if and when apprehended."). 
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decency and good behavior. 
The moral commitment against knowing killing can also be 
seen in modem regulatory statutes. Several modem environmental 
laws prohibit knowingly releasing hazardous substances into the 
air or water or onto the land with knowledge that these releases 
place another person in "imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily injury."s These releases are criminal acts; for example, 
under the Clean Air Act, people who commit these acts may be 
sent to prison for up to fifteen years.9 Although here the offense is 
knowing endangerment,1O not knowing killing, the Clean Air Act's 
prohibition must flow from the general norm against knowing 
killing. Why would life-threatening endangerment matter if killing 
did not? 
In early 2005, a federal grand jury indicted the company W.R. 
Grace and several of its top corporate officials under this provision 
of the Clean Air Act. II Among other allegations, the indictment 
states that W.R. Grace and its corporate officials violated the Clean 
Air Act by knowingly exposing the citizens of Libby, Montana, to 
asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore without the citizens' 
knowledge or consent. 12 One vivid example of how W.R. Grace 
and its officials allegedly treated the citizens of Libby is the 
company's provision ofthis contaminated ore to the high school to 
serve as the foundation for its running track. 13 Another equally 
arresting example is the alleged provision of such ore to the 
elementary school to use as the foundation for a skating rink. 14 
The basic claim is that W.R. Grace and its officials knowing 
exposed the people of Libby to a life-threatening substance. It is 
hard to make sense of the normative underpinnings of the knowing 
endangerment provision at issue in the Grace case without 
recognizing the moral commitment against knowing killing. 
8 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(3)(A) (2000) (water pollution); 42 U.S.c. 
§ 6928(e) (2000) (hazardous waste); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (2000) (air 
pollution); see a/so, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-464(A) (2005); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(a)(2)(A) (2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-7-122.1(3)(a) 
(2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-9-24(a) (2001). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A). 
10 See id. 
11 Indictment ~~ 185-90, United States v. W.R. Grace, No. CR 05-07-M-
DWM (D. Mont. Feb. 7,2005). 
12 !d. 'II~ 76, 142. 
13 Id. 'II~ 24,25, 144. 
14 Id. '11'11141, 142. 
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My last example of the norm against knowing killing in U.S. 
law comes from tort law. The legal "formula" for determining 
negligence-familiar to any first-year law student-holds that a 
person is negligent if the burdens of precaution (that is, the costs of 
avoiding the accident) are less than the costs of the accident 
multiplied by its probability. This formula, dubbed the "Hand" 
formula after the judge who first stated it in algebraic form, 15 has 
inspired countless academic papers on the role of economics in tort 
law. 16 
But here is a funny thing: when private actors in court cases 
are shown to have actually used the Hand formula in the decision-
making that preceded the injury or death that led to the tort case-
when private actors use cost-benefit analysis to decide whether, for 
example, to adopt a safer product design-they are severely 
punished for it. 17 
To take one famous example, when Ford declined to make 
design changes to its Pinto on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis 
purporting to show that the design changes cost more than the 
value of the safety benefits they would have provided, it was 
slapped with what was a huge punitive damages award: $125 
million. 18 The company was also indicted for reckless homicide 
and criminal recklessness in connection with its Pinto design-
though a jury acquitted it of these charges. 19 Similarly, when it 
was discovered that GM had declined to make a safety-enhancing 
design change to Chevrolet Malibus (and other A-body cars) based 
15 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
16 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. VI en, An Economic Case for 
Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.V. L. REv. 1067 (1986); Mark F. Grady, Why 
Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical 
Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293 (1988); Patrick J. Kelley, The 
Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 731 (2001); Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of 
Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1679 (1996); Michael D. Green, Negligence 
= Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1605 (1997); Richard A. 
Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281 
(1979). 
17 See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 
52 STAN. L. REv. 547 (2000) (discussing several cases in which juries awarded 
high punitive damages after the companies had engaged in risk analysis). 
18 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358, 361 (Ct. App. 
1981). The trial judge later reduced this $125 million award to $3.5 million as a 
condition for denying a new trial. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto 
Case, 43 RUTGERSL. REv. 1013, 1017 (1991). 
19 See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1017. 
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on a cost-benefit analysis that showed that the design change was 
not worth it in economic terms, it, too, was hit with a very large 
punitive damage award: $4.8 billion.2o 
These examples from tort law are especially dramatic because 
they seem to conflict with formal statements of what negligence 
law requires. Juries have severely punished corporations for 
conducting the kind of economic analysis courts have suggested 
should be used to decide whether the defendant was negligent in 
the first place. One possible lesson to draw from this state of 
affairs is that the pull of the moral commitment against knowing 
killing is so great that even well-established legal formulas, like 
the test for identifying negligence, do not stand in its way. 
In short, there is a well-established legal norm-reflecting a 
well-established moral commitment-against one person 
knowingly killing another person. This norm is reflected in 
traditional laws against murder, in modem regulatory laws 
prohibiting knowing endangerment, and in old-fashioned tort 
judgments. This norm reflects, among other things, a widely 
shared aversion to one person's making the decision about death 
for another person. It reflects an aversion to one person's 
calculating in relation to another person that "it's okay by me" if 
she dies-or, in fact, "it works for me." According to the norm I 
have described, this kind of calculation not only does not 
deactivate the norm against knowing killing, but indeed, the 
calculation itself helps to prove that the norm has been violated. In 
this regard, recall that some state laws make the definition of 
murder tum on a pre-killing weighing of the choice whether to 
kil1.21 
Cost-benefit analysis in the context of life-threatening 
environmental risks involves a pre-killing weighing of the choice 
to kill. In this setting, economic costs of pollution-reducing 
strategies are balanced against the value, stated in terms of dollars, 
20 Anderson v. General Motors, Case BC 116926 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 9, 
1999); see also Andrew Pollack, $4.9 Billion Jury Verdict in G.M. Fuel Tank 
Case, N.Y. TiMES, July 9, 1999, at A8. Members of the jury speaking after the 
damages were awarded made clear that the economic decision making of GM 
clearly influenced their decision, with one jury member stating "we're just like 
numbers, I feel, to them ... [t]hat's something that is wrong." Id. The punitive 
damages award against GM was eventually reduced by the trial judge to $1.09 
billion. Peter Y. Hong, Judge Cuts Award Against GM to $1.2 Billion, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at Bl. 
21 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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of the people whom the environmental hazards in question will 
kill. The dollar value of the people who will be killed is 
determined by considering the monetary value that people place on 
relatively small risks to themselves, such as increased wage 
demands for extra risky work. These monetary values for risk are 
summed to produce a value of a "statistical life"-the value 
associated with the loss of one life through the imposition of fairly 
small risks on a population of people. 
I think it is obvious that cost-benefit analysis does not redeem 
knowing killing. Indeed, from what I have just said, it seems clear 
that using cost-benefit analysis to decide in favor of killing another 
person makes the killing worse, not better, from a legal and moral 
perspective. 
But in case this is not so obvious, let me explain by way of an 
example. Imagine a new version of the reality TV show 
"Survivor." In this show, the contestants who do not make the 
grade are not just kicked off the show; they are immediately 
executed. The developers of the show have determined that this 
program will be wildly popular with the public (in spite of, or 
perhaps in rebellious reaction to, the culture's moral norm against 
knowing killing). Indeed, the show will be so popular that its 
revenues will overwhelm the economic value of the lives lost on 
the show. Surely no one would assert that it would be appropriate 
to use cost-benefit analysis to decide whether to go on with this 
show. 
Notice how eerily cost-benefit analysis here matches the 
definitions of murder I have described. Certainly the cost-benefit 
analysis involves "premeditation"; that is its purpose-to think 
about the consequences of a decision, including lives lost, before 
acting. It also fits neatly with the state laws that look to whether a 
person who caused a death weighed the consequences before 
acting. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis in the context of lethal 
risks is the epitome of knowingly proceeding with life-threatening 
conduct. 
It does not help the TV producers in this case to say that they 
are not really "after" anybody, that they do not bear ill will against 
any particular person, that they do not even know who exactly will 
end up living or dying. What matters is that they have set 
themselves on a course of conduct that they know will result in 
human death. The producers can also have all the detailed consent 
forms in the world, and the forms won't help them; consent is not a 
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defense to murder.22 And, last, any pecuniary gain on the 
producers' part, arising from the deaths, only makes it worse for 
them according to the criminal law of many states.23 
In this highly stylized case, the practice of cost-benefit 
analysis runs hard up against the nonn against knowing killing. 
No matter how favorable the cost-benefit ratios may be for lethal 
reality TV, or snuff films, or modem gladiatorial contests, our 
legal and moral commitments condemn knowing killing, and they 
do not make an exception for profitable knowing killing. 
But is lethal reality TV analogous to lethal environmental 
risks? The point of the TV show I have described is to kill 
someone; without this plot twist, the show is just like any other. 
People and finns who impose lethal environmental risks on others, 
however, do not generally make it their point to kill someone. 
They would just as soon not kill anyone. The people killed by 
soot, arsenic, asbestos, vinyl chloride, and the like are not the 
targets of polluters; they are, to use the current euphemism, just 
collateral damage. 
Environmental risks, in other words, pose a case not of 
malice-the state of mind often associated with knowing killing-
but indifference. The perpetrators of environmental killings are 
often removed in space or time, or both, from the victims of their 
actions. Polluters might not even know who is exposed to their 
pollution, let alone who will eventually succumb to it. There is 
nothing personal, or even purposive, about the hann they cause. 
The law, however, and the moral commitments that the law 
reflects, do not excuse knowing killing even in these 
circumstances. A knowing killing in pursuit of some end other 
than death itself--cash, insurance money, notoriety-is no less 
murder because it seeks that other end. Even killing for the 
purpose of saving lives-including saving more lives than one 
destroys-is still generally considered murder. States generally do 
not recognize a defense of "necessity" in murder cases,24 and those 
22 See, e.g., Gospodareck v. State, 666 So. 2d 835, 842 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1993). 
23 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54b (West 2001); FLA. STAT. 
§ 921.141 (5)(f) (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (West 2000). 
24 See, e.g., People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 563 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(noting that the necessity defense may be available for any criminal act "except 
the taking of an innocent human life"); Esquibel v. State, 576 P.2d 1129, 1132 
(N.M. 1978) (holding that a duress defense is available "except when the crime 
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. that do so allow it only in emergencies?S This means that even 
where the necessity defense is recognized in cases of homicide, it 
is allowed only when an occasion suddenly arises in which the 
deaths of a few are required to prevent the deaths of many and not 
when killing becomes a part of long-term social or economic 
planning. As to this particular issue, to be sure, moral views can 
diverge quite appreciably from what the law requires, but even 
those philosophers who argue in favor of a more forgiving 
standard for killing undertaken in service of greater life saving take 
as their premise that life-saving is indeed the goal of the killing.26 
This cannot be said of the deaths that result from pollution, 
sanctioned by cost-benefit analysis. Life-saving is not the goal of 
permitting these deaths; economic efficiency is. While some 
adventurous souls argue that controlling pollution kills people 
because it costs money-which could otherwise have been spent 
by individuals on health care, better nutrition, and the like27-these 
arguments founder on the weakness of the empirical link between 
pollution control and human mortality.28 
Thus, cost-benefit analysis's pre-killing weighing of the 
decision whether to kill is justified neither by the fact that killing is 
not the purpose of the underlying enterprise nor by any need to kill 
a few to save many. Still, many observers likely will reel at the 
idea that lethal decisions undertaken on the basis of cost-benefit 
analysis amount to knowing killing. One likely objection will 
focus on a perceived difference between killing a known person 
and killing a "statistical" person. To understand the objection, it is 
necessary to provide a few more details about how cost-benefit 
analysts translate human lives into dollar terms. 
charged is a homicide or a crime requiring intent to kill"); ARIz. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-417(c) (2001); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.030(1) (LexisNexis 1999); 
Mo. REv. STAT. § 563.026(1) (2000); WIS. STAT. § 939.47 (1999). 
25 See Shaun P. Martin, The Radical Necessity Defense, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 
1527, 1567 n.169 (2005) (forty-four states allow the necessity defense only when 
harnl is illuninent.); see also Brent D. Wride, Political Protest and the Illinois 
Defense of Necessity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1070, 1075 (1987). 
26 See generally, e.g., Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. lO63 (1993) (describing conditions under which killing undertaken with 
the express goal of life saving can be justified). 
27 See, e.g., Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic 
Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147, 147-48 (1990); Randall Lutter et aI., The 
Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 ECON. 
INQUIRY 599, 599 (1999). 
28 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 1, at 56-59. 
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 
HeinOnline -- 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 530 2005-2006
530 N. Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LA W JOURNAL [Volume 14 
Everyone, even ardent defenders of cost-benefit analysis, 
agrees that cost-benefit analysis does not apply when we confront 
an identified person with certain or almost-certain death. Though 
economists have long used "willingness-to-pay" as the measure of 
value for cost-benefit purposes,29 this metric does not work with 
certain or almost-certain death. If I ask you how much you are 
willing to pay to avoid certain death, your answer will lIkely 
depend wholly on your ability to pay; the more you have, the more 
you will pay. If I ask you how much money you are willing to 
accept in order to accept death, I think you are likely to tell me to 
go away, to tell me that you are not in the market for certain death 
right now. Thus, whether formulated in the willingness-to-pay or 
willingness-to-accept framework, this inquiry goes nowhere in the 
context of certain death. Thus, economists have been willing to 
concede that when an identified person is threatened with death, 
we do not pause to do cost-benefit analysis before trying to rescue 
her;3o we don't calculate the costs of saving the little girl in the 
well, we just rush to the scene and do what we can to save her. 
To get around this problem, economists invented the 
"statistical" life. It is harder than one might imagine to pin down 
exactly what is meant by "statistical life.,,3! At the least, a 
statistical life is an unidentified life; we do not know who will die 
when a statistical life hangs in the balance. 
But why should a lack of knowledge about the ultimate 
victims of lethal conduct justify differential treatment of statistical 
and non-statistical lives? Suppose I randomly distribute lethal but 
undetectable poison, causing a fatal reaction indistinguishable 
from a deadly case of the flu, in a small percentage of a large 
population. Should the wisdom of my conduct be evaluated 
according to cost-benefit analysis? Isn't what I have done murder, 
according to the definitions we have just considered? Indeed, 
perhaps the defining act of knowing killing of our time-
terrorism-involves just the sort of unidentified victims I have 
29 See, e.g., Roland N. McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 
38 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 31-33 (1971); Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-years, and 
Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 205, 226 (2004). 
30 See, e.g., W. KIp VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 21, 29 (1992). 
31 See generally Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARv. 
ENVTL. L. REv. 189 (2000) (describing the difficulties posed by the concept of 
the statistical life ). 
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described. In short, I do not think the identifiability of the victims 
of lethal conduct gets us very far in explaining how decisions 
made on the basis of cost-benefit analysis are different from 
knowing killing.32 
Another way to define statistical life is as the collection of 
fairly small individual risks within a population. Here is how the 
economist Kip Viscusi describes statistical lives: 
[W]hen assessing the benefits of risk reduction, the pertinent 
value is the willingness to pay for the risk reduction. What we 
are purchasing with our tax dollars is not the certainty of 
survival. Rather, it is the incremental reduction in the 
probability of an adverse outcome that might otherwise have 
affected some random member of our community.33 
Some who advocate this view of the statistical life prefer the 
term "micromort," which is defined as a "one in one million 
chance of death.,,34 Perhaps a micromort would be valued at $5. If 
one million people were each willing to pay $5 to avoid such a 
risk, then we could say that they would collectively be willing to 
pay $5 million to avoid one death. But, the micromort advocates 
would remind us, we are still valuing risk, not life itself. Since life 
itself is not involved, neither is knowing killing. 
Simply calling what we are valuing "risk" (or "micromorts") 
rather than "life," does not change the fact that real lives, not 
statistical lives, hang in the balance. There are no statistical 
people; there are only real people. If a person dies due to an 
environmental hazard, a real person dies--even if we do not know 
who she is, and even if many other people were also exposed to the 
hazard that killed her. For the distinction between statistical and 
non-statistical lives to hold any normative significance, we must 
believe that in all cases to which it is applied, no one will die as a 
result of the hazard we are considering. If no one will die, then no 
life is lost, and we might as well describe the persons we expected 
to die as "statistical people." But if anyone dies--anyone-then 
the contrivance no longer works. Someone has died, that person 
was a real person, and our inability to identify that person by name 
32 For an excellent discussion, see John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. 
PUB. ECON. 91, 92 (1978). 
33 VISCUSI, supra note 30, at 19. 
34 A term first used in Ronald A. Howard, On Making Life and Death 
Decisions, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: How SAFE Is SAFE ENOUGH? 89, 99 
(Richard C. Schwing & Walter A. Albers, Jr. eds., 1980). 
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does not change the fact that she has died. 
To illustrate: suppose I activate a time bomb which, by my 
best calculations, will explode at a moment when the location of 
the bomb is packed with people. I miscalculate. Only one person 
is nearby, and only one person dies. The fact that my actions led 
to only one death rather than many does not make that one death 
any less the result of knowing killing. 
Many have argued that risk assessment overstates risk35 
(though others point out that it also understates risk in important 
ways36). However, the argument that estimated lives lost should 
be lower than risk assessments predict is different from saying it 
should be zero. In the kinds of large-scale decisions in which cost-
benefit analysis plays a prominent role, it is improbable that risk 
assessments predicting lives lost in the absence of regulation are so 
flawed that the prediction should be zero lives lost rather than 
some smaller but still positive number. 
In sum, the contrivance of "statistical life" does not justify 
allowing polluters to evade the norm against knowing killing. 
Nevertheless, several objections remain to my project of trying to 
activate the norm against knowing killing in the context of 
environmental hazards. 
First, even if scientists agree that some death will result from 
a certain pollutant, what if the person who decides to release the 
pollutant does not believe the scientists? Can a person have acted 
"knowingly" in causing a death if she sincerely believed no death 
would occur? I have a friend who worked as a lawyer representing 
tobacco companies. During his time working for tobacco 
companies, he came to believe that nicotine was not addictive. 
There is a large psychological pressure to believe one's actions are 
not hurting others. But it cannot be that erecting psychological 
barriers to conscious belief absolves one of the moral burden of 
avoiding consequences that are, psychological factors aside, 
practically certain to follow from one's actions. If one's hold on 
reality is so tenuous that one cannot differentiate right from wrong, 
then one's harmful actions might be excused from a moral and 
legal perspective. There is, however, a large difference between 
35 For a lucid account of major critiques, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING 
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 42-50 (1993). 
36 See, e.g., Adam N. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental 
Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 295, 340-52 (1995). 
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beliefs predicated on avoiding cognitive dissonance and beliefs 
predicated on the conviction that, say, you must shoot a person 
because God told you it is in that person's best interests to do so. 
In the corporate contexts in which many decisions about 
pollution are made, knowledge becomes even more problematic. 
Individual actors might convince themselves that someone else is 
taking care of whatever hazard they might identify.37 Or they 
might convince themselves that if no one is in fact taking care of 
the hazard, there must be no hazard. Knowledge dissipates in 
collective settings. Sometimes, however, knowledge dissipates 
due to deliberate conduct on the part of individuals; individuals 
might choose to compartmentalize knowledge so that everyone can 
plausibly deny responsibility for the harmful consequences of the 
collective enterprise.38 Here, too, it would be difficult to argue that 
one can escape the moral and legal implications of lethal conduct 
simply by remaining willfully blind to them. 
Another objection to my effort to bring decisions about lethal 
environmental hazards based on cost-benefit analysis within the 
ambit of knowing killing might be that people consent all the time 
to increased risk, and this consent should acquit polluters of moral 
and legal responsibility for deaths that occur due to increased risk 
from pollution. The trouble is that "consent," or "willingness-to-
pay" in the cost-benefit context, is manufactured by reference to 
the behavior of other people in different circumstances, often 
circumstances in which free and knowing consent is not even 
clear, as in workplace risks. Thus, current cost-benefit analyses 
use wage premiums discerned in studies using data from the 
1970s-data on accident risks, almost exclusively involving men, 
in a setting in which there is (by hypothesis) already a market for 
risk-to decide how much arsenic to allow in drinking water in the 
new century.39 Cost-benefit analysts call this operation "benefits 
transfer" and explain that it is necessitated by resource 
constraints.40 But cost-benefit analysis falls apart without this 
37 See, e.g., BIBB LATANE & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE 
BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T HE HELP? 90 (1970). 
38 For a discussion of the phenomenon of "moral distancing," see Benedict 
Carey, In the Execution Chamber, the Moral Compass Wavers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
7,2006, at Fl. 
39 See Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2311,2316-29 
(2002). 
40 For explanation of this technique, see Amy Sinden, The Economics of 
Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical 
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device. If analysts needed real consent to do their work, they 
would face the problem that some people wouldn't sell their 
entitlement to be free from whatever risk was being marketed. 
Indeed, results of previous studies on individual behavior in risky 
settings suggest that a substantial number of people simply refuse 
to participate in certain markets for risk.41 Thus consent cannot be 
a catch-all justification for knowing imposition of lethal risks; 
often enough it simply does not exist. 
When people expose other people to environmental hazards 
that are practically certain to cause some of the exposed people to 
die, the former have engaged in knowing killing and thus in 
presumptively morally problematic conduct. There is no obvious 
way around this conclusion. Undoubtedly many readers will 
believe that this argument proves too much, that it makes killers 
out of the people who produce the things--electricity, oil, 
chemicals-that bring good things to life. My main object, 
however, has not been to settle the question of what should be 
done when we find that our common practices run up against the 
norm against knowing killing; it may be that we need to think 
about what would justify knowing killing in the circumstances I 
have described. My main object, rather, has been to suggest that 
our discussion of environmental policy has been impoverished by 
it~ lack of attention to our underlying moral commitments. We 
might well decide that much lethal pollution is acceptable from a 
moral perspective, but we need to have an argument for why this is 
so. For too long, we have elided the moral content of decisions 
about the environment by talking about deaths caused by 
environmental problems in amoral terms. It seems morally 
unproblematic, for example, to cause the death of a "statistical 
person." But once we recognize that statistical people do not exist, 
that real people are at stake in our decisions about pollution, then 
we can begin to have a more honest and productive discussion 
about the moral duties we owe to people we place at risk. 
Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 129, 182 n.238 (2004). 
41 See W. Kip Viscusi et ai., An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer 
Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465, 477 (1987) 
(reporting that in an economic survey regarding household products, the vast 
majority of parents with children living in their homes refused to accept 
discounted or free riskier products). 
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